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Empirical research on corporate tax rates formation usually relies on inter-
dependence among jurisdictions and on economic variables like diﬀerences
in country size, budgetary needs, openness to international investment and
multinational ﬁrms, and on core-periphery arguments. Similarly, theoretical
models privilege tax competition, or possibly yardstick competition, along
a two step game: in the ﬁrst step governments ﬁx the tax rates and in the
second one ﬁrms decide on the allocation of investment and taxable proﬁt
accordingly. In this paper we expand the set of potentially explaining vari-
ables and include them in the empirical analysis below; then we revise the
supporting theoretical model adding a preliminary step where governments
are lobbied by the ﬁrms.
The main issue in this paper is whether governance, political and eco-
nomic factors inﬂuence the corporate income tax rate. Indeed, next to the
classical determinants of tax and yardstick competition based on the in-
ﬂuence of tax rates in neighboring countries, a number of economic and
political factors might be at work, including good governance and political
orientation.
To take an example, a century ago, in 1909, the US decided to introduce
a corporate income tax at a rate of one per cent.1 That rate went up and
down during the next one hundred years, but a characteristic of the up
jumps is that they were mostly carried out during periods of war or of crisis,
like the World War I, the Great Depression, the World War II, the Korean
War and the Vietnam War; then additional taxes were introduced and in
some cases later integrated within the regular rate. In some sense, it can be
observed a kind of ratchet eﬀect.2 The corporate tax rate increased during
periods when political events limited the participation of the people to the
decisions of the government as well as the downward pressures of lobbying
groups. However, in periods of usual business, when lobbying groups are
presumably at work, the corporate tax rate followed a slow decrease.
More generally we want to examine whether and how governance and
political factors might be important determinants of the corporate tax rate.
Regarding the former we adopt the deﬁnition of the World Bank and we
interpret governance as institutional quality.
Our empirical results show that, next to economic factors, institutional
and political factors do inﬂuence the corporate tax rate. Especially we ﬁnd
1See IRS (2002).
2See for instance Hindriks and Myles (2006), page 82.
2that good governance reduces the corporate income tax rate, and that a
parliamentary system, especially plurality election, and religious or nation-
a l i s te x e c u t i v e si n c r e a s et h a tt a xr a t e .I nas e n s eo u rr e s u l t sa r ei nl i n ew i t h
Campos and Giovannoni (2008) who ﬁnds empirical evidence that "ﬁrms
that favor lobbying tend to be in countries that are less politically unstable,
more democratic, with more independent media, and which have experi-
enced more political leadership alternations. Moreover, they are also more
likely to be located in federal states, with presidential systems and, within
presidential systems, where the president has fewer powers. Within parlia-
mentary systems, lobbying seems to be more eﬀective where there are more
constraints on the executive". In other words, the political and institutional
factors that we ﬁnd signiﬁcant in our study could be interpreted as instru-
m e n t sf o rt h ep r e s e n c eo fl o b b i e si nac o u n t r y .W eu s et h a tp o s s i b l el i n kt o
construct a discussion and an explanation of our empirical ﬁndings.
To the best of our knowledge, no paper so far has studied empirically
the link between the corporate tax and governance and institutional factors.
However some papers argue for a greater debate, or more democracy, on the
issue of corporate taxation (see Ganghof and Genschel, 2007) and Li (2006)
tries to observe the political causes of tax incentives.3
In general, on the empirical side, the link between political variables and
the corporate tax has not been clearly established. Most articles study-
ing tax interactions ﬁnd no or little relation between the tax rate and the
right or left orientation of the government (see Gomes and Pouget 2008,
Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano, 2008). That result contrasts with the
papers claiming an association between ideology and ﬁscal preferences (see
Tavares 2004).4
Economic factors are now standard in the literature aiming at explaining
the corporate income tax rate, especially in the empirical studies based on
the theoretical tax competition literature which is sharply increasing since
the 80’s (for a survey, see Wilson, 1999). Among those contributions we can
mention Slemrod (2004) which sets forth the negative link between openness
of an economy and the corporate income tax rate, as well as Rodrik (1997),
Swank and Steinmo (2002) and Winner (2005). Finding a positive link
between those variables or no relation at all are Quinn (1997) and Garrett
3He studies the link between democracy, autocracy and tax incentives to FDI. However,
he bases his argument on the reduction of business costs through the respect of the rule of
law and better democratic institutions, and not on the link between those variables and
the presence of lobbying groups.
4Let us add that Hahm et al. (1995) do not uncover a clear correlation between party’s
idelogies and public deﬁcits.
3(1998) respectively. Our results clearly support Slemrod view.
Other articles have found that the corporate tax rate of neighboring
countries is the main determinant of the tax rate. They estimate tax reaction
functions suggested by the models of yardstick or tax competition (see e.g.
Brueckner, 2003). Typical of those models are Devereux, Lockwood and
Redoano (2002, 2008), Redoano (2003), Altshuler and Goodspeed (2002),
Besley, Griﬃth and Klemm (2001), Ruiz and Gérard (2008), Cassette and
Paty (2008), Crabbé and Vandenbusshe (2008), Gomes and Pouget (2008).5
Our results show some support for tax interdependence, but the ﬁndings are
not robust with respect to the speciﬁcation of the model.
Although the results obtained in the empirical investigation are inter-
esting per se, they lack of theoretical foundation. Therefore we complete
the empirical exercise with a theoretical analysis. Standard models of tax
c o m p e t i t i o nl i k et h a tu s e db yG é r a r d( 2007), provide a theoretical support
for tax interdependence and the inﬂuence of economic variables like the size
of the country and the degree of openness. However channels for the other
variables set forth in our empirical exercise are missing; they have to be
suggested and incorporated in the theory. This is the reason why we expand
our model of tax competition in order to allow for a channel reﬂecting the
action of those variables. We conduct that extension using the seminal work
of Grossman and Helpman (1994), which refers to Bernheim and Whinston
(1986), an approach also used by Conconi (2003), as well as by Marceau and
Smart (2003) and by Mahle and Runkel (2009); alternatively we also follow
Lorz (1998).
In section 2 below, we propose a broad discussion of how governance, po-
litical and economic factors may inﬂuence the corporate income tax. Section
3 is dedicated to our empirical investigation: we present our data set; we
report on our empirical exercise ﬁrst estimating a panel data without spa-
tial lags, then taking into account the tax rates in neighboring countries. In
section 4 we turn to the theoretical exercise, suggesting a model which both
reinterprets and enlarges standard modeling in the ﬁeld. Finally, Section 5
provides some conclusions.
2 Governance, political and economic factors
In this section, we propose a broad discussion of how governance, political
and economic factors respectively, may inﬂuence the level of the corporate
income tax rate.
5For more references see Ruiz and Gérard (2008).
42.1 Governance and institutional quality
T h e r ei sn ou n i q u ed e ﬁnition of governance in the literature. Here we inter-
pret governance as "institutional quality" and more particularly we adopt
the deﬁnition of the World Bank.
The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project of the World Bank
deﬁnes governance as "the traditions and institutions by which authority in
a country is exercised. This includes the process by which governments are
selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to eﬀec-
tively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens
and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interac-
tions among them" (see Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón, 1999, and
the World Bank).
Measuring that broad concept is diﬃcult. However, there are diﬀerent
types of data which are informative or can be interpreted as proxies to
evaluate "good" governance. For instance, the WGI provides six dimensions
of governance: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of
Violence, Government Eﬀectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and
Control of Corruption.6
Those indicators might reﬂect, in a way, the strengths and weaknesses
of the democratic process. As pointed out by Hirst (2000), "Democracy
is valuable in this context if it provides legitimation for good governance.
Multi-party competition and free elections are valuable in preventing crony-
ism and corruption, and in building public support for development strate-
gies, but only if parties eschew extremism and play the political game by
the appropriate liberal rules". In other words, the form of democracy which
prevails in western economies may provide a support for good governance.
For Campos and Giovannoni (2008), ap r i o r i , "stronger democracies have
stronger checks and balances, voters are better able to monitor what hap-
pens at the political level, respect for the rule of law is more widespread and
so democratization should help reduce both lobbying and corruption". How-
ever, stronger democracy may give rise to lobbying groups which would be
absent in autocratic regimes. Those lobbies can freely develop in a democ-
racy such as in the U.S. where contributions for political parties are legal
6Those indicators are constructed using many diﬀerent individual sources provided by
diﬀerent organizations.
5and widely accepted7 or in Europe through pressure groups.8 Nowadays,
lobbies are seen in advanced democracies as a necessary connection between
the civil society and the state.
Campos and Giovannoni (2008) empirically found that "ﬁrms that favor
lobbying tend to be in countries that are more politically stable, more demo-
cratic, with more independent media ...". We can interpret those ﬁndings
as a positive link between lobbying and governance indicators, which pro-
vide us with some appropriate instruments to signal the inﬂuence of interest
groups. Other more direct variables to observe the inﬂuence of lobbying,
such as campaign contributions, are only available for countries where lob-
bies are regulated (ex. the U.S.).
In our context of business taxation, lobbying groups are in general quite
signiﬁcant and inﬂuential (see Dreyfuss, 2001). They establish their presence
in all democratic countries around the world in order to inﬂuence congress-
men and to try to impose their reform agendas. We should expect that the
actions of those pressure groups contribute to a drop in the corporate tax
rate, as a signal of the beneﬁts obtained. Otherwise their presence would
be hard to justify and the market forces would have put an end to their
industry a long time ago.
Lobbies target law-makers, but they need an appropriate institutional
environment to operate and develop. As suggested by Kimenyi and Mbaku
(1994) "Rent seeking accordingly takes diﬀerent forms in democratic and
autocratic regimes. In democratic systems lobbying of legislators can take
place for diﬀerent policies. In autocratic regimes, rule is in general pro-
tected by a military force, and the political elite has a privileged position
in rent-seeking or rent-extracting behavior which would be compromised by
democracy (...) Because rents in dictatorial systems are created primarily by
the dictator’s decrees and distributed by the ruler’s handpicked appointees,
lobbying of legislators is not an issue". Autocratic regimes could be nor-
mally characterized as short term rent seeking governments or as aiming
to develop nationalistic entities. None of those governments will prioritize
long-term policies in favor of business, such as tax cuts.9 There is evidence
7The role of campaign contributions on the US congress votes has been extensively
analysed. It is in general assumed that the inﬂuence of the interest groups on politicians
is carry out through donations to the political campaigns by political action committees,
but also by placing lobbyists in Washington. See for instance Anson (2006).
8See for instance Bouwen (2003), McGrath (2002) or the Registers of Interest Repre-
sentatives of the European Union.
9However we do not rule out that autocratic regime can implement short-term policies
in favor of certain business groups such as monopoly licenses, preferential national steel
purchases in time of crisis or similar measures.
6that autocracies limit trade (see Mansﬁeld et al., 2000, Milner and Kubota,
2005, Aidt and Martin Gassebner, 2007) and economic freedom (Sturm and
de Haan, 2003; Giavazzi and Tabellini, 2005), which goes against the objec-
tives of the business community and free market principles. Therefore, we
would expect that those governments most often produce higher corporate
tax rates.
Another reason why we could observe higher taxes in countries with na-
tionalist or religious governments is provided by Kai Konrad (2007). He
suggests that countries may try to make the tax base immobile: "The activ-
ities include informative or persuasive advertising, political persuasion and
inﬂuence, and eﬀort that increases the value of the brand name of a coun-
try and enables policies that make investors or citizens loyal to this brand.
These include educational eﬀort that generates home attachment or even pa-
triotism among the own population". Nationalist or religious governments
are likely to be well designed to achieve such goals.
Besides governance factors, other institutional variables seem to ease
lobbying activities. Campos and Giovannoni found that "ﬁrms that favor
lobbying (...) are also more likely to be located in federal states, with pres-
idential systems and, within presidential systems, where the president has
fewer power. Within parliamentary systems, lobbying seems to be more
eﬀective where there are more constraints on the executive".
There is contrasting evidence on the link between federal states and cor-
porate taxation and between federal states and lobbying. On the one hand,
when provinces or states within a country have taxation powers, they can
engage in a tax competition process which can lead to an overall lower tax
burden for the country, as it is suggested by the case of Switzerland (see for
instance, Feld and Reulier, 2005, though we cannot reject that other reasons
may explain low tax rates in Switzerland). On the other hand, the same
decentralization process can lead to administrative ineﬃciencies or yardstick
competition in infrastructure and public good provision which demand ad-
ditional resources and eventually a higher tax burden. A similar process
can occur between federal states and lobbying. On the one hand, there is
a general view that local governments are more susceptible to be captured
by lobbies (see Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000, Bordignon, Colombo and
Galmarini, 2008, Redoano, 2007, Lockwood, 2005). Nevertheless, most lit-
erature has focused on the link between federalism and corruption instead
of lobbying (see Fisman and Gatti, 2002, Freille, Haqueand and Kneller,
2007).
7In our view,10 lobbying looses eﬀectiveness in federal states because
politicians are limited in their commitment to defend a particular policy
given that diﬀerent levels of government can intervene. Therefore, we ex-
pect that federal countries have higher corporate tax rates.
The literature argues that parliamentary systems will reduce the incen-
tive to lobby the legislature. For Bennedsen and Feldmann (2002) a par-
liamentary system will induce voting cohesion in the coalition in order to
preserve the government and therefore, interest groups have fewer incen-
tives to lobby. On the other hand, congressional systems do not have those
constraints and interest groups may have more inﬂuence on legislators. Help-
man and Person (2001) also highlight that parliamentary systems produce
greater legislative cohesion and aﬀects the strategic interaction with lobbies.
In our context, we expect that parliamentary systems will in general have
a higher corporate tax since the legislature will be less sensitive to business
pressures.
2.2 Political Factors
Campos and Giovannoni ﬁnd that fewer powers or more constraints on the
executive facilitate lobbying. Measures of political power could be indicated
by the margin of victory or parliamentary majority. Another indirect mea-
sure of power is the simple use of the electoral system. Following Duverger’s
principle, we know that a plurality rule election system will tend toward
a two-party system, marginalizing small political parties. Hence, a single
party will be more likely to hold the majority of seats in parliament and
to have more power to pass legislation with less negotiation. On the other
hand, a proportional representation system lets new parties to develop fast
and the constant negotiation among the coalition reduces the power of the
government.
Under those circumstances a plurality system can give more power to the
executive, reduce the inﬂuence of lobbying and induce a higher corporate
tax rate.
Other political factors aﬀecting the corporate tax rate are partisanship
and the electoral cycle. On these points, there is an abundant literature,
but the articles reach diﬀerent conclusions. A priori, it can be argued that
left-wing parties increase the tax burden on ﬁrms and their owners; but on
the other hand, it can be also argued that since a rise in corporate taxation
reduces new investments and aﬀects future employment, left-wing parties
10Campos and Giovannoni provide the same argument, but they arrive to a diﬀerent
conclusion.
8will prefer low tax burdens on ﬁrms. Beside the references already mentioned
in the introduction the reader can ﬁnd further discussion on these points in
Quinn and Shapiro (1991a,b), Timmons (2005) and references therein.
2.3 Economic Factors
Many politicians and academic researchers believe that an increasing open-
ness or globalization of the economies is leading countries to a race to the
bottom in corporate taxation (European Commission, 2001). That idea
supports the view that economic and competition reasons linked with free
market are the main determinants of the corporate tax.
Among the domestic determinants of corporate taxation are normally
considered country’s revenue needs and factors aﬀecting the mobility of the
tax base - such as the size of the economy, the number of potential customers,
or the country’s openness.
On the other hand, there is now a huge literature claiming that tax and
yardstick competition inﬂuence the local corporate tax. Yardstick compe-
tition explains that voters may evaluate the decision of their policy makers
by comparing their actions with similar policies conducted in neighboring
regions. Under those circumstances, governments may be forced to emulate
each other leading to uniformity in taxes. Tax competition argues that in
open economies "independent governments engage in wasteful competition
for scarce capital through reductions in tax rates and public expenditure
level" (Wilson, 1999). Nevertheless, both models arrive to the same con-
clusions: taxes depend on own countries characteristics and on neighboring
countries tax rates.
3 Empirical Investigation
This section is dedicated to our empirical investigation. We ﬁrst present the
data set. Then we report on our empirical ﬁndings ﬁrst using panel data
without spatial lags, then taking into account the tax rates in neighboring
countries.
3.1 Data
Thereafter, Table 1 lists the data series used in our empirical exercise and
Table 2 provides the reader with the descriptive statistics for all variables.
93.1.1 The statutory corporate income tax rate
Our dependent variable is the statutory corporate income tax rate. Eﬀective
tax rates such as the eﬀe c t i v ea v e r a g et a xr a t e( E A T R )a r en o tu s e di nt h i s
paper mainly because of the amount of information we would need for to
construct those variables in our set of 5311 or 9312 countries. Nevertheless,
as pointed out in Ruiz and Gérard (2007, 2008) the changes in the EATRs
are mainly due to changes in the statutory rate.13
For our panel estimation of Section 4, we take the period 1997-2008 with
the statutory tax rates for 53 countries and the years 2007-2008 for 93 coun-
tries.14 We use tax data collected by KPMG. In the set of control variables
we include governance, political and economic variables in order to capture
the factors discussed above and deemed to inﬂuence the determination of
the corporate tax rate. Additionally, in section 5, we take into account a
possible design of strategic tax interactions among countries.
The statutory corporate tax is valued at the 1st of January of each year.
Therefore all other explanatory variables are expressed at time -1. For the
few cases where data are missing, we consider that the variable has not
changed from the last available observation.
11Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile,
China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Luxemburg, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland,
Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States, Vietnam.
12Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Bel-
gium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Es-
tonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland,
India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, South
Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, Libya, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mex-
ico, Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua
New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russia,
Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Swe-
den, Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirate, United
Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia.
13The corporate income tax rate for each country considers the federal (or unique tax)
and an average of provincial, cantonal and communal taxes when it is applicable.
14The data set could be observed as too comprehensive for some readers, because of
the diﬀerent heterogeneous countries we use. However, all those countries have a business
community that could inﬂuence the decision of the government, given the appropriate
political circumstances.
103.1.2 Economic factors
The ﬁrst four explanatory variables are classical economic factors aﬀecting
the corporate tax rates; they come from the IMF.
The variable cgdp is the part of government consumption in the GDP. It
refers to what Slemrod calls the folk theorem among tax policymakers: "all
taxes have weaknesses, and the marginal social cost of the weaknesses in-
c r e a s e sw i t ht h et a xs y s t e m ’ sr e l i a n c eo na n yg i v e nt a x .T h e r e f o r e ,r e v e n u e s
should be collected from a variety of taxes rather than a small number". As
an implication, if government spending increases, revenue needs to increase
and corporate taxation should follow that tendency.
The relative size of the country’s gross domestic product, gdpp,a n dt h a t
of its population, pop, aim to capture the size eﬀect. Several theoretical
models such as Bucovetsky (1991) analyze the eﬀect of diﬀerences in the
size of the competing countries, coming to the conclusion that the larger the
country the higher the tax rates it chooses.
Openness variable, o, tries to see whether there is a link between openness
of an economy and the corporate tax rate.
3.1.3 Governance and political factors
Most of our governance and political factors could be interpreted as instru-
ments to signal the inﬂuence of interest groups, and we understand our
empirical ﬁndings in that linethat. We once more repeat that other direct
variables to observe the inﬂuence of lobbying, such as campaign contribu-
tions, are only available for countries where lobbies are regulated (ex. the
U.S.).
The variable "voice and accountability", vacr, is a measure of governance
proposed in the World Governance Indicators (WGI) project of the World
Bank. The WGI also publishes measures of Political Stability and Absence
of Violence, Government eﬀectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and
Control of Corruption. However, all those indicators are highly correlated
among them. For that reason, we have decided to select only one, Voice and
Accountability which measures "perceptions of the extent to which a coun-
try’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as
freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media". Following
the discussion of section 2 we would expect that the better the governance
indicators, the easier business lobbying groups develop, and therefore, the
lower the corporate tax rate is.
Governance and political factors come from the Database of Political In-
11stitutions (DPI) of the World Bank. Variable sysp is the variable SYSTEM
in the DPI, but with 1 for Parliamentary and Assembly-elected President
and 0 for Presidential regime. We expect that a parliamentary system, es-
pecially when combined with a plurality voting rule - see below - reduces
the power of the interest groups and therefore downward pressures on the
corporate income tax rate.
Variable rc i st h ev a r i a b l eE X E C R L Si nt h eD P I ,b u tw i t h0f o rL e f t
and 1 for Right, Center, No information and No executive. We use this
classiﬁcation to clearly identify leftist parties (communist, socialist, social
democratic, or left-wing). We already mentioned the lack of evidence in the
literature for a clear link between a right-left variable and taxation, but a
priori we would expect that a left-wing government impulses higher taxes
on enterprises.
The variables nat and rel are respectively the variable EXECNAT and
EXECREL in the DPI. They indicate with 1 the countries where the exec-
utive is classiﬁed as nationalist or religious. We expect that those govern-
ments weaken lobbying groups, make the tax base less mobile and generate
a higher corporate tax rate.
The fraction of seats held by the government is the variable MAJ in the
DPI, and reﬂects the margin of majority of the government. We expect that
a large margin of majority increases the power of the executive and reduces
the power of lobbies.
Similar to the previous variable, we measure the power of the executive
with one typical voting rule. The variable hous is equal to HOUSESYS in the
DPI giving value 1 when a plurality voting system predominates in the House
of Congress and when the Legislative and Executive Indices of Electoral
Competitiveness liec is equal or smaller to 4. A plurality system will tend
to concentrate power on two parties and we expect that this concentration
of power on two parties - or on one party - reduces the action of business
lobbying groups and preserves a higher corporate tax rate.
3.1.4 EU and federation dummies
The EU variable is just a dummy showing the EU membership.
Finally, fed is a dummy variable indicating that a country is a federal
state; in that matter we use the classiﬁcation provided by the Forum of
Federations (FF) and we add to it Papua New Guinea.
12Table 1: Description of variables
Variable Description Source Expected
sign
t Statutory corporate income tax rate 1997-2008 KPMG
cgdp Government Consumption / GDP IMF +
gdpp GDP / GDP US * 100 IMF +
o Openess (Exp + Imp)/GDP IMF -
pop Population IMF +
vacr Voice and accountability WGI -
sysp Parliamentary 1 and presidential system 0 DPI +
rc 0 for left party (1 right, center, etc.) DPI -
nat nationalist party = 1 DPI +
rel Religious executive = 1 DPI +
majp Fraction of seats held by the government DPI +
lege Legislative election in the year DPI -
hous Plurality system and no legislative 1(liec≤4), DPI +
proportional representation 0
EU EU member DPI -
liec Legislative indice of elec competiveness DPI
fed Federal countries 1 FF ?
13Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Sample 1996-2007 (53 countries)
Variable Mean Median Min Max SD
t 30.78 30.00 57.50 10.00 6.763
cgdp 15.49 15.16 27.50 4.364 5.061
gdpp 5.933 1.401 100.0 0.016 15.00
o 86.55 72.72 371.4 14.93 57.41
pop 85.35 16.28 1329 0.270 225.2
vacr 67.67 75.30 100.0 5.263 26.23
sysp 0.667 1 1 0 0.472
rc 0.657 1 1 0 0.475
nat 0.066 0 1 0 0.249
rel 0.116 0 1 0 0.321
Sample 2006-2007 (93 countries)
Variable Mean Median Min Max SD
t 29.83 30.00 57.50 0.000 7.719
cgdp 15.86 15.81 28.84 4.364 5.129
gdpp 4.545 0.964 100.0 0.016 12.99
o 88.21 76.22 371.4 14.93 52.02
pop 67.40 11.12 1329 0.270 194.7
vacr 63.55 66.83 100.0 1.923 26.89
sysp 0.590 1 1 0 0.492
rc 0.686 1 1 0 0.464
nat 0.073 0 1 0 0.260
rel 0.114 0 1 0 0.318
143.2 Panel estimation
In this section we ﬁrst estimate a classical panel data model without spatial
lags. Then we estimate reaction functions of the interjurisdictional Nash
non-cooperative game and thus introduce spatial lags. In Appendix A we
examine the special case of EU membership and raise the question whether
or not EU membership implies higher or lower corporate tax rates?
3.2.1 Pooled cross-section estimation
Let us begin by examining a classical panel data model. We consider a panel
without and with time ﬁxed eﬀects. In the last part of the section we will
present the results of a panel with spatial lag eﬀects in order to observe
possible strategic tax interactions among countries. Thus we estimate
tiι = α + Xiιθ +  iι (1)
where t is the tax rate, α and θ vector are parameters to be estimated and
  is the error term.15
Tables 3 and 4 show the results obtained with the statutory corporate tax
rate as dependent variable and various sets of independent variables. Each
column corresponds to a speciﬁcation of the equation tested and provides
the values of the coeﬃcient estimated as well as the probability of being
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
The 1st column — column (1)16 — ests forth the classical economic and
demographic eﬀects. All variables have the expected sign and are signiﬁcant.
We observe that countries which have higher consumption expenditures im-
pose a higher corporate tax. The size variables gdpp and pop support the
idea that a large country may face a lower elasticity of capital to the tax
rate, and therefore, sustain a higher tax. The o result gives support to the
argument that the openness of the economies is leading the countries to
lower tax rates.
The 2nd column introduces the parliamentary system variable. We delete
cgdp and pop from the estimation because they are respectively positively
and negatively correlated with the governance variables.17 A parliamentary
system induces a higher corporate tax. We interpret that result as a lower
power of lobbying groups due to the need of politicians to keep a permanent
coalition on all pieces of legislation in order to preserve the government.
15That equation should be compared with equations (8) and (9) in Section 5.
16Columns are numbered across the two tables.
17Observe that although the eﬀect of cgdp and pop is captured by sysp,t h eR
2 slightly
increases, showing an improvement in the regression.
15The 3rd column considers the governance variable vacr.I t s h o w s t h a t
better governance seems to decrease the tax. This might reﬂe c tt h ef a c tt h a t
countries with better freedom of association and freedom of media, besides
being perceived as more democratic, also permit the action and coordination
of business lobbying groups.
The variables sysp and vacr are slightly correlated as suggested in col-
umn (4). For that reason, we will just consider sysp in the other estimations.
The 5th column shows that the right-left distinction is not a signiﬁcant
determinant of the corporate tax.
Column (6) considers nationalist and religious executives. Clearly, they
are signiﬁcant determinants and their coeﬃcients are relatively high. Coun-
tries with a nationalist executive have a corporate tax approximately 3
points higher than other countries and for governments with a religious exec-
utive the eﬀect if even higher. In our opinion those results reﬂect the power
of the executive to impose its agenda, and to generate national attachment
among the business community.
Column (7) shows that the fraction of seats held by the government is
not a signiﬁcant determinant of the corporate tax rate.
Column (8) shows the absence of a cyclical adjustment of the corporate
taxation related to legislative elections.
Column (9) suggests that a plurality voting system or a concentration
of power on two or one party may constraint the freedom of lobbying.
Column (10) reﬂects that nationalist executives and plurality system are
signiﬁcant in the absence of the rel variable.
Column (11) shows that when the system is of parliamentary type but
one party is probably enough to sustain the government or when there is
just one party in the parliament, the power of the executive increases and
constraints lobbying activity.
The 12th column shows that federal states have a positive eﬀect on cor-
porate taxation. That result goes in the opposite direction of the paper
of Campos and Giovannoni. However, in their article only two countries,
Bosnia and Russia, can be considered as federal state following the classiﬁ-
cation of the Forum of Federations. Moreover, our ﬁndings support the idea
that in federal states lobbying looses eﬀectiveness because politicians are
limited in their degree of commitment to defend a particular policy given
that diﬀerent levels of government can intervene.
Column (13) sets forth that the EU membership implies a higher cor-
porate tax. This result may seem paradoxical given that KPMG’s report
16Table 3: Results
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
C 29.324 31.034 32.482 32.871 31.142 31.016 31.450 30.982
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
cgdp(−1) 0.163
0.00
gdpp(−1) 0.126 0.137 0.147 0.142 0.137 0.141 0.142 0.140
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
pop(−1) 0.002
0.04
o(−1) -0.023 -0.030 -0.030 -0.026 -0.030 -0.035 -0.034 -0.035
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
vacr(−1) -0.028 -0.011
0.01 0.27
sysp(−1) 2.352 2.862 2.323 1.915 1.995 1.918
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
rc(−1) -0.174
0.74
nat(−1) 3.206 3.371 3.194
0.00 0.00 0.00











Time ﬁx. No No No No No No No No
Observ. 636 636 636 636 636 636 636 636
Countries 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53
Sample 97-08 97-08 97-08 97-08 97-08 97-08 97-08 97-08
R2 0.197 0.206 0.215 0.182 0.206 0.259 0.260 0.259
Log lik. -2047.9 -2044.4 -2040.5 -2053.9 -2044.4 -2022.2 -2022.0 -2022.2
17Table 4: Results
Variable (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
C 30.616 30.613 31.223 30.247 30.762 30.380 29.051 29.049
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
cgdp(−1)
gdpp(−1) 0.124 0.130 0.129 0.112 0.113 0.128 0.138 0.138
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
pop(−1)
o(−1) -0.036 -0.031 -0.035 -0.035 -0.037 -0.033 -0.042 -0.042
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
vacr(−1)
sysp(−1) 1.710 2.100 1.544 1.576 -1.072 -1.073
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.39 0.39
rc(−1)
nat(−1) 2.809 3.291 2.219 2.519 3.065 2.840 2.560 2.562
0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.23
rel(−1) 4.625 5.476 4.274 4.525 4.466 5.244 5.244
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
majp(−1)
lege(−1)
hous(−1) 1.706 1.173 1.640 2.619 1.703 3.069 3.067







Time ﬁx. No No No No No Yes No Yes
Observ. 636 636 636 636 636 636 186 186
Countries 53 53 53 53 53 53 93 93
Sample 97-08 97-08 97-08 97-08 97-08 97-08 07-08 07-08
R2 0.273 0.229 0.295 0.286 0.279 0.340 0.178 0.181
Log lik. -2016.3 -2035.0 -2006.6 -2010.6 -2013.6 -1985.6 -648.7 -648.4
18shows a clear fall in the corporate income tax rate if the EU. We examine
more carefully that dummy variable in Appendix A.
Column (14) shows that the introduction of time ﬁxed eﬀe c t sd o e sn o t
change the results.
Columns (15) and (16) show that in a shorter period of time but with
more country observations, the parliamentary system and nationalist exec-
utive variables are no longer signiﬁcant. However, the economic variables
of size and openness are still signiﬁcant and, what is more important for
this article, the variables rel and hous which reﬂect to a certain extent a
concentration of power, have a positive impact on the level of the corporate
tax.
3.2.2 Do countries play Nash equilibrium strategies in tax rates?
In this last part of the section we try to capture corporate tax interactions
among countries. The basic result of the tax competition literature states
that the local capital tax rate should react positively to tax changes in
competing countries, see below equations (6) and (7). The classical approach
for empirically testing this assumption has been to estimate tax reaction
functions (see Brueckner, 2003). Those reaction functions triy to capture
how the magnitude of a tax, a decision variable for a government, depends
on taxes set by other countries. In other words, the equation to be estimated
might be written
tiι = α + β
X
j6=i
 ijt,ι + Xiιθ +  iι (2)
where t is the tax rate, α, β and θ vector are parameters to be estimated
and   is the error term. Additionally, we assign weights  ij indicating the
possible inﬂuence of neighboring taxes in the determination of the local
tax.18
The second term on the RHS of equation (2) is referred to as the spatially
lagged dependent variable, with associated autoregressive parameter β.I f
the slope of the estimated reaction function is non-zero we can speak of a
strategic interaction among governments.
Weighting schemes Uncertainty with respect to the proper speciﬁcation
of the spatial weights matrix is a fundamental problem in the study of strate-
18Problems related to the estimation of equation (2), notably the endogeneity of tj’s
and possible spatial error dependence, are discusssed in Anselin (1988) and in Ruiz and
Gérard (2008).
19gic interactions, especially because we do not know exactly the structure of
the international pressures. A potential problem of drawing inappropriate
conclusions arises, as the speciﬁed weight matrix may not be the true weight
matrix. In other words, detecting ap r i o r ithe correct links among countries
for tax settings purposes (if any) raises problems. Clearly choosing diﬀerent
w e i g h t si sl i k e l yt or e s u l ti nd i ﬀerent estimations of β.
Here, we will base our estimations on geographical weights. Those
weights are the most widely used in the literature because they rely on
the idea that geographical distance factors are relevant in the economy and
that competition is more likely to occur among close neighbors.
Equation (2) is estimated using three weighting matrices, each of them




The ﬁrst weighting matrix considers as neighbors all countries of the
sample and the weights are simply the inverse distance. A second weight-
ing scheme assigns an inverse distance weight to those countries within a
distance-band δ required to ensure that each location has at least one neigh-
bor, i.e.
 ij =( 1 /dij)/
n X
j=1
(1/dij) if dij ≤ δ
=0 if dij >δ
The third weighting matrix gives an equal weight to those countries within
the distance-band explained before.
Pooled cross-section estimation with spatial lags: results The re-
duced form equation (2) is estimated using maximum likelihood methods,
in the Matlab package developed by Elhorst (see Appendix B).19
The results are presented in Tables 6 and 7. The ﬁrst column of each ta-
ble repeats the results obtained above, without spatial lag - columns (9) and
19It is well known that the OLS estimator in the presence of spatially lagged dependent
variable will be biased as well as inconsistent. Two methods are usually used to deal with
this problem. The ﬁrst one is to estimate the reduced form equation using maximum
likelihood methods. The second way is an instrumental variable or two stage least squares
approach. Anselin (1988) also proposes Bayesian techniques instrumented among others
by LeSage (1997).
20(15) respectively; those ﬁgures are included to allow for an easy comparison
and to show consistency among the various estimations. The discussion of
our explanatory variables has been already provided in Section 2, and, as we
can see, their eﬀects do not vary across the various spatial associations. On
the other hand, the parameter β is the coeﬃcient we are interested in this
section; it represents the level of interdependence or competitive pressures
that countries face when setting their corporate income tax rate.
The table shows some evidence of tax interdependency, although the re-
sults are not robust with respect to the speciﬁcation of the model. Observing
the results for 53 countries without time ﬁxed eﬀects, we do ﬁnd evidence of
strategic interactions. This may suggest that countries are mimicking taxes
of their close neighbors.20
However, with the introduction of time ﬁxed eﬀects this pattern disap-
pears. That may indicate that countries are following a general trend that
is independent of geographical location. Even more, for 93 countries - the
second part of the Table - and the sole years 2007-2008, we do not ﬁnd any
evidence of strategic interactions.
Summing up, our ﬁndings indicate that strategic tax interactions among
close geographical neighbors are not the main reason aﬀecting the corporate
tax.
20Similar results were also found by Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano (2002) and by
Redoano (2003).
21Table 5: Results Spatial Lags: 53 countries
Variable (9) Inv. Dist. weight Inv. Min. weight E q .M i n .w e i g h t
C 30.616 16.569 22.944 21.898
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
gdpp(−1) 0.124 0.128 0.128 0.109 0.126 0.105 0.124
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
o(−1) -0.036 -0.035 -0.033 -0.037 -0.033 -0.036 -0.033
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
sysp(−1) 1.710 1.446 1.598 1.557 1.558 1.454 1.528
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
nat(−1) 2.809 3.034 2.815 3.286 2.915 3.212 2.931
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
rel(−1) 4.625 4.280 4.494 4.382 4.436 4.550 4.464
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
hous(−1) 1.706 1.502 1.726 1.362 1.649 1.312 1.614
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
 ijt 0.463 -0.055 0.259 0.041 0.298 0.068
0.00 0.67 0.00 0.47 0.00 0.27
Time ﬁx. No No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observ. 636 636 636 636 636 636 636
Countries 53 53 53 53 53 53 53
Sample 97-08 97-08 97-08 97-08 97-08 97-08 97-08
R2 0.2727 0.3195 0.3400 0.3024 0.3403 0.3084 0.3411
Log lik. -2016.32 -1999.07 -1985.52 -2006.80 -1985.40 -2004.68 -1985.14
22Table 6: Results Spatial Lags: 93 countries
Variable (15) Inv. Dist. weight Inv. Min. weight E q .M i n .w e i g h t
C 29.051 30.416 30.451 27.774
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
gdpp(−1) 0.138 0.138 0.138 0.139 0.140 0.137 0.137
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
o(−1) -0.042 -0.042 -0.042 -0.042 -0.042 -0.042 -0.042
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
sysp(−1) -1.072 -1.102 -1.133 -1.089 -1.095 -1.072 -1.073
0.39 0.36 0.35 0.37 0.36 0.37 0.37
nat(−1) 2.560 2.562 2.567 2.562 2.564 2.563 2.564
0.23 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22
rel(−1) 5.244 5.241 5.238 5.227 5.223 5.299 5.284
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
hous(−1) 3.069 3.128 3.185 3.214 3.253 2.963 2.990
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
 ijt -0.05 -0.10 -0.054 -0.069 0.049 0.036
0.87 0.74 0.70 0.62 0.74 0.81
Time ﬁx. No No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observ. 186 186 186 186 186 186 186
Countries 93 93 93 93 93 93 93
Sample 07-08 07-08 07-08 07-08 07-08 07-08 07-08
R2 0.1779 0.1781 0.1813 0.1787 0.1818 0.1784 0.1808
Log lik. -648.71 -648.69 -648.35 -648.64 -648.31 -648.66 -648.39
4 Theoretical modeling
In this section we suggest a theoretical exercise which extends standard
tax competition modeling through the introduction of government lobbying
by the multinational. Doing so we provide theoretical foundations for the
empirical exercise conducted in the previous section. Our ﬁrst attempt lies
in Grossman and Helpman (1994) tradition, which refers to Bernheim and
Whinston (1986), an approach also used by Conconi (1998), Marceau and
Smart (2003) and Mahle and Runkel (2009). The second attempt follows
Lorz (1998). Before addressing the lobbying issue we present the reference
model corresponding to the situation without lobbying.
234.1 A world without lobbying
Suppose, like in Gérard (2007), a two-country-one-multinational model where
the two countries compete for attracting the real capital of the multinational.
That game follows a two-step pattern. In the ﬁrst step the governments de-
cide non-cooperatively of the tax rates - we make no distinction between
statutory and eﬀective tax rate; in the second step the multinational revises
the location of its real capital. We solve the problem backward.
4.1.1 Step 2, the multinational
The multinational aims at maximizing its value. Therefore, given the tax
rates announced by the governments, it reallocates its real capital. However
such reallocation has a cost deemed to obey a quadratic form. The total
amount of real capital of the multinational is normalized to unity with ini-
tially a fraction α0 located in country a and a fraction 1 − α0 located in
country b; after reallocation, those fractions are α and 1 − α respectively.















In that equation, p stands for the EBITDA (Earnings before Interest
payments, Taxes and Depreciation Allowances) of the multinational. The
ﬁrst order condition of that maximization w.r.t. α is21
dV
dα
=( τb − τa)
p
r
− γ (α − α0)=0
so that optimal distribution of investment is characterized by




4.1.2 Step 1: the local governments decide on the tax rates
Each local government decides on the corporate tax rate on the proﬁto f
the multinational on its territory. It takes its decision in order to maximize
an objective function based on the positive eﬀects that the location and the
investment of the multinational is expected to have in the region in terms of
economic activity, denoted by wα for region a,w i t hw the shadow price of
labor, and on the quantity of public goods that taxing the multinational will
allow it to provide to its inhabitants, uτaαp/r again for region a; u is the
21The second order condition, −γ<0,i ss a t i s ﬁed.
24shadow price of public goods, thus the cost of transforming private income
into public goods, the size of that cost is interpreted as a sign of government
ineﬃciency. It turns out that the local government of region a maximizes a
social welfare function





































where we observe that the slope of the reaction function is well smaller than
one.
Similarly, the reaction function of the other country is
τb =

























so that both the size of the fraction of the investment initially hold by the
country and that of the cost of changing the interjurisdictional distribution
of the whole investment - the inverse of the openness - push the tax rate
upward.
Since the former might depend on the size on the local market, we can
interpret those comparative statics results as meaning that a larger region
might have a relatively higher corporate income tax rate, and that reducing
the obstacles to the free movement of (real) capital pushes the tax rates
downward. It turns out that the reaction functions obtained above provide
us with theoretical foundations for empirical equation (2).
22T h ed e r i v a t i v eo fV w.r.t. τa is −αpr.T h a t o f α w.r.t. τa is −p/γr.T h e s e c o n d
order condition of that maximization is −(u − s)(1/γ)(p/r)
2 < 0.
25For the purposes of an empirical analysis, the set of those two reaction
functions gives the structural form of the model, not however the reduced
form. That latter is obtained by computing the Nash equilibrium, solving
























and provides theoretical support for equation (1) of the empirical investiga-
tion conducted above.
As previously suggested the values of the tax rates at the Nash equi-
librium increases with α0 in a and with 1 − α0 in b,a n dw i t hγ in both
countries. Moreover the tax rate decreases when government ineﬃciency
cost u goes down, see e.g. for country a
dτa
du
∝ (3u − 2s)
2 w
γ
+( u − s)s(4u − 2s)+α0u2s>0















Wb = u(1 − α)






Now let us see how the reaction functions, the distribution of investment
and the levels of social welfare are aﬀected by lobbying activities.
264.2 A world with lobbying multinational: Grossman-Helpman
tradition
In this world the multinational is ready to pay an amount of money to each
government in exchange of a more favorable tax rate; and governments are
deemed not only to maximize the social welfare of their country residents
but also to pursue the best interest of the multinational in exchange of
contributions.
Let us start with Grossman-Helpman (1994) Proposition 1, adapted to
our model; they refer it as B-W for Bernheim and Whinston (1986). Then
a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium might be characterized by
(a) Ca and Cb contributions of the multinational to the re-
spective governments are feasible, by which is meant non nega-
tive and consistent with ﬁrm’s value;
(b) τL
a maximizes Ga = Wa + σaCa where σa stands for the
weight given by the government to a contribution of the multi-
national enterprise, an indicator of its sensitiveness to lobbying;
and similarly for the other country;
(c) τL
a maximizes Ω+Wa+σaCa,w i t hΩ = V −Ca−Cb,t h e
value of the ﬁrm net of its contributions to the governments.
In that framework, step 2 of the previous game becomes step 3. Step 1
becomes step 2 and a new step 1 is introduced where the ﬁrm decides on
its contribution to the governments. Actually the new step 3 replicates the
former step 2 and equation (4) holds.
4.2.1 Step 2: determination of the tax rates
According to (b) of Grossman-Helpman Proposition 1, the government of
country a maximizes Wa + σaCa. In line with (c) of the same proposition
τL


























27However the multinational, if allowed to decide on the tax rate levied by



















which provides the reaction function
τL
a =










and similarly for the other country
τL
b =










so that tax rates at Nash equilibrium become
τL
a =













































A ﬁrst lesson from that exercise is that an increased sensitiveness of the
government of, say, country a to lobbying from the multinational pushes the











However that response to lobbying depends on the sensitiveness of the other
country too since θb depends on σb.
28Using equations (14) and (15) we can compute the equilibrium values
of αL, WL
a and WL
b . Let us do that for countries equally open to lobbying
activities (θa = θb = θ, σa = σb = σ);t h e n
αL =
θ +( 1− θ)α0
1+θ
=





a =( u − σ)γ
¡
αL¢2
=( u − σ)γ
µ









provided that u>3σ which seems to be a reasonable assumption. That
last observation makes a link with the next issue: the determination of the
political contributions.












4.2.2 Step 3: Political contributions
In line with Marceau and Smart (2003) equation (8) we can deﬁne the polit-
ical contribution of the multinational to the government of country a (viz.
of country b) as the minimum amount the multinational has to pay for that
government being at least as well oﬀ though adopting the tax rates favorable
to the ﬁrm. Therefore the optimal contribution Ca is such that
σaCa = Wa − WL
a (20)
using equations (11) and (18).
Under the assumption that the countries are equally open to lobbying,










− (u − σ)
µ
u − σ + uα0
3u − 2σ
¶2#
294.3 A world with a lobbying multinational: alternative ap-
proach (Lorz, 1998)
Let us keep the basic model unchanged; in Lorz (1998) terminology it corre-
sponds to countries ruled by capital-poor government. The capital-abundant
party or simply the multinational, will try to turn the social welfare func-
tion maximized by governments into one more favorable to them through
the addition of a term σaV (viz. σbV ). However the value of σa will increase
with that of the political contribution paid to the government of country a,
Ca.
Therefore step 1 and step 2 repeat those encountered in the Grossman-
Helpman tradition, but with now σ contingent to C.S t e p 3 i s t h e n r e f o r -
mulated as the maximization by the multinational of V −Ca − Cb w.r.t. to
σa and σb. Let us do that with respect to the former assuming again that
the two governments are equally responsive to political contributions. The









and we follow Lorz(1998) assuming that political contribution have a di-










= −α = −










Then the ﬁrst order condition becomes, under our simplifying assumption,







Solving for σ and using the deﬁnition of C provide us with the optimal
political contribution of the multinational.
305C o n c l u s i o n s
The results of our estimation suggest that next to the classical economic fac-
tors of size and openness of an economy, and strategic interactions among
countries as well, political and institutional variables matter for determin-
ing the statutory corporate tax rate. In particular we ﬁnd that countries
with good governance indicators have a lower tax rate; and that a par-
liamentary system combined with a plurality voting rule increases the tax
rate. Additionally, countries with religious or nationalist executives are also
characterized by higher tax rates.
Our conclusions are in line with Campos and Giovannoni (2008): like in
their contribution, the political and institutional factors that we found to
be signiﬁcant also set forth the presence of stronger lobbying activities. In
other words, the political and institutional variables we ﬁnd signiﬁcant in
our study could be interpreted as instruments for the presence of lobbies in
ac o u n t r y .
The result suggesting that nationalist executives allow for higher rates
might be related to Konrad (2007) hypothesis that countries may generate
home attachment to keep and tax mobile resources.
Theoretical grounds for those ﬁndings and interpretation can be found in
Grossman-Helpman tradition of taking into account lobbying and political
contributions. Therefore we expanded our supporting theoretical model in
that direction.
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36Table 7: EU dummy
1997-2008 2007-2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
c 30.384 30.321 32.656 31.677 30.100 28.415 27.081
(0,00)a (0,00)a (0,00)a (0,00)a (0,00)a (0,00)a (0,00)a
EU (-1) 1.319 1.528 -6.208 -2.965 -4.282
(0.02)b (0.01)a (0,00)a (0.02)b (0.00)a
EU15 (-1) 2.411 0.850
(0,00)a (0,63)
Country ﬁx No No Yes Yes No No No
Time ﬁxed No Yes No Yes No No No
Observ. 636 636 636 636 636 186 186
R2 0.008 0.095 0.703 0.779 0.026 0.049 0.001
Log lik. -2115.0 -2085.8 -1732.1 -1638.0 -2109.3 -662.3 -666.8
p-values are in parentheses
a Signiﬁcant at 1% level.
b Signiﬁcant at 5% level.
6 Appendix A. Does EU membership imply higher
or lower corporate tax rates?
We could be tempted to argue that the EU integration has increased the
competition among Member states and therefore has forced them to reduce
their tax rates. However, is that true? Is it only a responsibility of the
European Union? As depicted below, it seems that it is not the case. Let
us show what would be the result introducing only a dummy for the EU in
our regression.
The ﬁrst column in Table 7 shows that the corporate tax rate for the
countries belonging to the EU was 1.32 points higher than for the rest of the
53 countries during the same period (31.70 for EU countries against 30.38 for
non-EU countries in average). However, observing the third column we can
see that the three EU countries that joined the Union during that period (in
our sample we have only three such countries, the Czech Republic, Hungary
and Poland) decreased their tax rates of 6.21 on average after joining the
Union. Nevertheless, this value is smaller after controlling for the negative
time trend that all countries faced. When we just observe the average of
EU15 in the 5th column we see that the tax was 2.41 higher for those
countries.
37Nevertheless, those results are clearly inﬂuenced by the data sample and
no consideration is given to the other nine new Member states of the EU
which have very low corporate tax rates. The second part of the Table shows
that during the last 2 years, the EU countries had, on average, a corporate
tax rate 4.28 lower than the rest of the 93 countries. And, last column,
the corporate tax rate of the EU15 in the last two years was just above the
average, although with large heterogeneity among countries.
7 Appendix B
Writing (2) in matrix form
τ = βWτ + Xθ+  







lnσ2 +l n|I − βW| (21)
−
1
2σ2 [(I − βW)τ − Xθ]
0
[(I − βW)τ − Xθ]
with τ as a NT x 1 vector, X as a NT x K matrix, W the full NT x NT
weights matrix, I the full NT x NT identity matrix and   ∼ IID(0,σ2I).








lnσ2 + T ln|IN − βWN| (22)
−
1
2σ2 [(I − βW)τ − Xθ]
0
[(I − βW)τ − Xθ]
where WN is the N x N weights matrix.
A two-stage procedure can be used to maximize the log-likelihood func-
tion of the model (see Anselin 1988, p. 181-182, Anselin and Hudak 1992,
Elhorst 2003).
The ﬁst order condition of the maximization of equation (21) provides
us with an estimator
e θ =( X0X)−1X0 (I − βW)τ
or
e θ =( X0X)−1X0τ − β(X0X)−1X0Wτ
= e θ0 − βe θL
38The two coeﬃcient vectors will provide two sets of residuals
e0 = τ − Xe θ0
eL = Wτ − Xe θL
Diﬀerentiating the log-likelihood function with respect to σ and putting








σ3 [(I − βW)τ − Xθ]
0




[(I − βW)τ − Xθ]
0
[(I − βW)τ − Xθ]





0 (e0 − βeL)










0 (e0 − βeL)
¸
+ T ln|I − βW| −
NT
2
That expression is a nonlinear function in β that can be maximized by
means of numerical techniques.
The estimation process proposed by Anselin (1988) and implemented in
the Matlab package of Elhorst consists to
- Carry out OLS of X on τ: yields e θ0.
- Carry out OLS of X on Wτ: yields e θL.
- Compute the residuals e0 and eL.
-G i v e ne0 and eL, ﬁnd β that maximizes L.
-G i v e nβ, compute e θ and c σ2.
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